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Abstract
Commercially-acquired drones threaten airport operations due to limited knowledge of
airspace safety regulations or deliberate action by drone operators. This study aims to
determine whether the investment cost of a drone-defence system can be justified in
relation to the financial cost of a drone-related shutdown. To that end, a case study of
Frankfurt Airport is carried out with simulations of different disruptions during a peak-
activity period similar to the 2018 Gatwick drone incident. With data on passenger
traffic and airline schedules, we developed a passenger recovery algorithm to determine
the amount of delays caused by the disruptions and the costs for the airport operator and
the airlines. Results show that the investment in a drone-defence system is offset by the
costs of a 48-h continued closure or several smaller closures, but since the largest share
of costs is borne by the airlines, investments should be shared between both
stakeholders.
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Introduction
Despite the recent COVID-19 pandemic having an adverse effect in air travel world-
wide (Suau-Sánchez et al. 2020), the expected recovery of air transport demand in the
medium term (IATA 2020), paired with adverse shocks in the industry, will again place
increasing pressure on airport networks to cope with disturbances (Cardillo et al. 2013).
Traditionally, these shocks include industrial actions, terrorist attacks and adverse
weather events. For example, Hurricane Sandy in 2012 led to airport closures and the
cancellation of approximately 180,000 flights (De Langhe et al. 2013). However, a new
threat has recently emerged. Drones became a nuisance for airports worldwide as the
number of drone incidences is increasing while effective countermeasures are still in
their testing phase (McFarland 2019). Initially created for military purposes, drones
found their way into consumer and commercial applications. Studies have shown that a
drone colliding with a larger aircraft can potentially cause more damage than a bird
strike. Additionally, there is also a business risk involved that could cost airports,
airlines and passengers several millions of pounds or euros in revenue from delayed
and cancelled flights (Hornigold 2019). One of the most significant incidences caused
by drone activity occurred at London Gatwick on December 2018, disrupting flights of
more than 140,000 passengers (nearly 59% being EasyJet customers) and about a
thousand flights (Rawlinson 2019; Detrick 2019). The economic loss from the 33-h
disruption was estimated at approximately €55.8 million, primarily to airlines. EasyJet
announced a loss of €16.7 million in revenue and customer welfare costs.
Technologies that provide active countermeasures to deal with drone threats in
restricted airspaces come at a cost. The technology deployed during the Gatwick
incident include a military-grade laser range finder for tracking the drones’ position
and a jammer to interfere with signals sent by the operator to the drone (Anon, 2018).
This cutting-edge technology has a price tag of €2.9 million per set. They are called
Drone Domes, of which the British Army purchased six (Duggan 2019). The owners of
Gatwick confirmed (Liptak 2019) that they spent millions on equipment (Rawlinson
2019) and installation for their anti-drone defence system. Due to the high costs of anti-
drone systems, airports and airlines may want to balance this price with the total cost
associated to extreme airport closures. In relation to this, there is a small number of
studies (Yan and Lin 1997; Rupp et al. 2010; Gordon et al. 2007) that focus on
estimating the economic implications of airport closures for diverse stakeholders
resulting from airport closures. However, these studies mainly employ qualitative
approaches and there are no past academic studies that estimate the economic costs
of airport closures in a peak activity scenario.
We provide a case study for Frankfurt International Airport (FRA) in order to allow
for comparison and a discussion on the main cost drivers. In Germany, the number of
drone incidences increased from 14 to 158 between 2015 and 2018. 31 events were
logged at FRA alone in 2018 (Anon 2019a). The aim of this paper is to determine
whether the investment in a drone defence system at Frankfurt airport can be justified in
comparison to the total costs experienced by the airport operator due to a complete
shutdown for a period of up to 48 h as well as whether the affected airlines would have
an interest in contributing depending on their financial impact.
We build on the concepts and frameworks presented in past papers to develop a
quantitative approach to estimate costs. We focus on departing passengers during the
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disruption period to estimate the local effect experienced by Frankfurt Airport and the
airlines operating in the German hub. At the core of our methodology, there is a
simulation of delays using an algorithm for passenger recovery, which serves as
reference to estimate passenger welfare costs. This simulation requires both passenger
and airline schedules data for the airport. The airline schedules data is extracted from
the Official Airline Guide (OAG) while the passenger itineraries are sourced from the
well-known Market Information Data Transfer (MIDT) dataset. Optimal recovery
opportunities for each passenger are computed with recovery aircraft including seat
capacity restrictions and also high-speed rail. Welfare costs for airlines consist of meal
vouchers and hotel stays. Costs for the airport operator relate to loss of landing and
passenger charges.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature
review on drone technology and the costs associated with airport closures. Furthermore,
air transport resilience and vulnerability topics will be investigated in order to place our
contribution within the existing literature. Chapter 3 describes the methodology in
detail, including all assumptions and limitations of our passenger recovery algorithm.
Additional information about the case study of Frankfurt airport and all data sources is
provided. Chapter 4 summarises the main research findings by providing a breakdown
of the costs under different scenarios, as well as the implications for the airport operator
and airlines. Chapter 5 concludes with a summary and some recommendations for
future research.
Background and literature review
The Gatwick incident
Between the 19th and 21st of December 2018, a 33-h closure at UK’s second busiest
airport affected up to 140,000 passengers causing more than 1000 flights to be
cancelled or delayed (Rowlatt 2019). The operators of Gatwick airport repeatedly tried
to reopen the airport. However, on each occasion a drone reappeared, up to a total of
approximately 40 times (Douglas 2018), forcing the runways to be closed as per the
airport security protocols. The chaos started with the first drone sighting at 21:03 GMT
on Wednesday 19th of December. By 10 am on the next day, the police were unable to
find neither a connection to terrorism nor that the disruption was not accidentally
caused by a pilot (Douglas 2018). At noon, the airport reported that approximately
110,000 passengers were expected to pass through the airport terminals on Thursday
20th of December, a majority of whom would likely experience cancellations and
disruptions. In the late afternoon, the British Army was involved to help with the
operation as military-grade drone-defence technology was spotted on top of the airport
building. Throughout Friday 21st of December, flight traffic was expected to normalise,
and the airport was almost back to normal in the early evening. Another drone sighting
caused the airport to be closed for yet another hour, but after 6:30 pm all runways
remained available for landings and departures.
The 33-h disruption during the Christmas peak travel period resulted in costs of
approximately £50 million (Calder 2019; Detrick 2019). According to Calder (2019),
the grounded flights costed EasyJet £5 million (€4.5 million) in lost revenue and almost
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£10 million (€9 million) on customer welfare costs (meals, accommodation, and
alternative transport). Many passengers stranded in the terminals had to sleep on
benches or even on the terminal floor. Extending the impact proportionally to other
airlines, the total damage can be estimated at between £35 to £40 million (€31.5 to 36.0
million). Initial figures from January 2019 estimated the impact for the airport at around
£15 million (€13.5 million) but reports from June 2019 claim the chaos just cost the
airport £1.4 million (€1.3 million) (Menendez 2019; Topham 2019) because airlines
ultimately took most of the fall for the incident.
Gatwick may not be the last airport drone incident, but it was the most significant in
terms of economic damage. Unless counter-drone systems are used more frequently
around the world, incidents like this might happen again. The market already provides a
handful of counter-drone technologies (Stokel-Walker 2019). However, all these sys-
tems are costly. Thus, airports may want to balance the cost of a drone defence system
with the costs of an airport shutdown.
Available drone-defence systems and investment costs
Flying drones near airports endangers the safety of passengers and flight crew onboard
an aircraft. The probability that the drone is drawn into the turbine is small, but its
battery poses a potential risk of fire inside the turbine as it may not shatter on impact.
Furthermore, due to the high relative speed of collision, a drone with two kg of mass
could exert enough force to break the windshield of some aircraft types, resulting in the
loss of cabin pressure (Porter 2010).
In view of the potential risks, authorities are increasingly interested in the develop-
ment of technologies to counteract illegal drone activity (counter-drone technology),
also known as counter-unmanned aerial vehicles (C-UAV). The market for C-UAV is
currently estimated to be worth between 500 million to one billion dollars (Wright
2017). The most common methods used to counter UAVs are frequency jamming,
spoofing, laser, nets, counter-drone and projectiles. Frequency jamming technologies
disrupt the link between the operator and the drone, forcing the vehicle to descend or
return home. Hijacking a drone’s communication system is referred to as “spoofing”
and allows the user to take over control of the target drone. A laser beam system can
provide enough energy to partially or completely destroy vital segments of a drone to
stay airborne, causing it to fall to the ground. Nets can also be employed to entangle a
target drone making it unable to remain airborne. A counter-drone system (Dedrone
2019) involves deploying a separate drone to destroy or disrupt a target drone resulting,
most commonly, in the loss of both drones. The organizations that adopt this technol-
ogy commonly use a combination of interception elements.
According to Pinkstone (2018), the equipment employed at Gatwick was a thermal
and optical laser rangefinder system able to track drones in a radius from three to six
miles. This device is connected to a radio frequency jamming system (Bravo 2019),
which was complemented with a six-directional radar able to pin-point the drone
operator once inside the perimeter range. Both systems work together and are known
as a “Drone Dome”. Initial reports (Duggan 2019; Pinkstone 2018) claimed that the
British Army spent £15.8 million (€17.6 million) for six Drone Dome systems, which
gives a unit price of £2.6 million (€2.9 million). Early reports from January 2019 state
that Gatwick Airport spent £800,000 (€720,800) (Apen-Sadler et al. 2019) while
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reports from June 2019 claim that the airport ended up spending £4–5 million (€3.6–4.5
million) (Menendez 2019; Topham 2019; BBC 2019) on anti-drone technologies. This
would be the reference value for the minimum investment necessary to protect Frank-
furt Airport in our case study.
Costs of airport closures
An airport shutdown is defined as a situation when an airport is unable to offer its full
capacity due to exogeneous reasons (De Langhe et al. 2013; Rupp et al. 2010).
Shutdowns may be total or partial and can originate from infrastructure problems
(weather or technical problems) or human factors (security). According to De Langhe
et al. (2013) there are two key differences between weather and security-related
shutdowns. First, weather-related closures can, to a certain degree, be predicted in
advance such that the airport can take pre-emptive measures while security shutdowns
can, almost certainly, not be predicted and leave the airport more exposed. Finally,
weather conditions may affect multiple airports that are geographically concentrated in
a region while security incidents usually affect only a single airport at a time. After the
decision of closing the airport has been made, the operator will immediately send out a
Notification to Airmen (NOTAM) to the airlines, as well as informing the passengers as
soon as possible. Based on past events involving drone-related airport closures (Taylor
2018; Deutsche Welle 2019), the standard reaction is to close the affected airport
initially for 30 min, which, in most cases, exceeds the average flight time of commer-
cially available drones (BBC 2018). After reopening, the airport may operate at reduced
capacity because of the missing capacity from aircraft that were not able to land during
the closure period. Furthermore, the unpredictability of the drone attack may lead to a
total closure rather than a partial one. A second difference with other types of security
shutdowns (such as a terrorist attack) is the ability of the airport to reopen at any time
after the drone has been neutralized if there is no physical damage to the infrastructure.
This can make the management of passenger terminals more difficult as passengers are
less likely to leave the terminal (or stop coming in) if flights can resume at any time. On
the other hand, being a concentrated event, other nearby airports remain unaffected and
available to serve the disrupted passengers.
Identifying the affected stakeholders is a key step in measuring the effects of an
airport shutdown. Maertens (2013) mentions that such type of event can affect not only
the air transport value chain but also the entire economy of the affected country,
particularly if the airport under attack is a primary hub. Within the aviation sector,
De Langhe et al. (2013) mention the airport operator, airlines, passengers, and service
providers. The focus for this research will be on the first three due to the lack of data on
the latter. There is a fair number of studies on the determination of the economic
impacts of airport closures (Yan and Lin 1997; Rupp et al. 2003; Gordon et al. 2007;
Maertens 2013; Serrano and Kazda 2018; Pejovic et al. 2009). Based on these studies,
we decided to implement a bottom-up approach considering some of the airport- and
airline-associated costs indicated in Table 1.
Airports will experience losses in terms of aeronautical revenues, which depend on
traffic volumes that become disrupted during the shutdown (Maertens 2013). For
example, in Frankfurt Airport, the operator charges a landing fee according to the
maximum take-off weight of the relevant aircraft, and another fee per departing
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Airport resilience and vulnerability
Vulnerability can be defined as “a susceptibility to incidents that can result in a
considerable reduction in network serviceability” (Berdica 2002). This concept can
be linked to two elements: the probability of a disruptive event occurring and the
Table 1 Airport- and airline- related costs during an airport closure
Airport Airline
Loss of aeronautical revenue Loss of revenue from ticket sales
Loss of non-aeronautical revenue Cost of grounded aircraft
Increased labour and material costs Customer welfare expenses and compensation
Source: Own elaboration
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passenger depending on the flight destination. Losses in non-aeronautical revenues
(e.g. retail, food, etc.) will be experienced if the airport perceives a fixed percentage of
revenues from the concession. Maertens (2013) states that labour and material costs
will also depend on passenger volumes yet only in the long run, since most airport
expenses can be considered fixed in the short run. However, major disruptive events
can result in increased terminal facility expenditures.
In regard to airlines, the European Union (EU) legislation 261/2004 (EC 2004)
grants passengers the right to claim compensation in the event of flight delay or
cancellation. However, air carriers are not liable to pay passenger compensation if
the “cancellation occurs in extraordinary circumstances which could not have been
avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken” (EC 2004). In the Gatwick
case, the UK Civil Aviation Authority confirmed that the drone incident was an
extraordinary circumstance and airlines should not be obliged to pay compensation
(Morris 2018). Nevertheless, the airline is still liable to provide their passengers with
accommodation (for overnight stays), meals and refreshments, appropriate means of
communication, and airport transfers. This is unless the passenger decides to cancel
their trip, so their behavioural choices affect airline costs. Following Maertens (2013),
passengers affected by a short interruption of a few hours can be expected to continue
their trip. When shutdowns increase in duration, the proportion of passengers switching
to other modes of transport or cancelling their trip increases. In medium to long-haul
flights, cancellations are typically lower due to road or rail alternatives being generally
inconvenient. On the other hand, passengers with short-haul flights typically either
cancel their trip entirely or switch to other mode of transport to their destination like
rail. Business and leisure passengers show differences in the acceptable delay experi-
enced during a travel disruption. On average, business passengers show lower tolerance
for flight delays compared to leisure passengers (Jiang and Ren 2019). In the end, the
airline can also decide to cancel the flights directly and offer passengers a refund, so
welfare costs are limited by airfares.
All of the metrics above depend on an assessment on passenger delays, which, in
turn, depend on how vulnerable the affected airport is to the disruptive event and how
much time it requires to resume normal operations (i.e. resilience).
damage the event causes (Jenelius et al. 2006). Faturechi and Miller-Hooks (2015) list
dozens of published works about the resilience of transport networks. An established
approach to determine system damage and vulnerability is to model the redistribution
of traffic flows under disruptive events by means of user re-routing algorithms (Jenelius
et al. 2006; De los Santos et al. 2012 or Rodríguez-Núñez and García-Palomares 2014).
This allows for disruption costs to be calculated from the users’ perspective by
comparing their original and altered itineraries. Translating these concepts into an
aviation network means to gather information about airline schedules and passenger
bookings and then modelling how the carriers adjust to disruptions by delaying and
cancelling flights, relocating disrupted passengers, and reassigning crews and aircraft to
different routes (Barnhart 2009). As metrics of system damage, we can mention the
number of disrupted passengers, the percentage of those passengers relocated, and the
difference in time between the original and the rescheduled itineraries which equals the
total delay experienced (Bratu and Barnhart 2006).
Studies that develop a passenger relocation algorithm to investigate the vulnerability
and resilience of air transport networks are scarce in the literature. Moreover, most
studies do not incorporate actual data on passenger bookings. For example, Cardillo
et al. (2013) designed a passenger rescheduling algorithm simulating random failures in
an air transport network to reassign affected passengers to alternative itineraries and
determine the changes in the network’s topological indicators. Hossain et al. (2013)
developed a rescheduling algorithm to account for airport capacity and ground transfer
times between airports in Australia. The resulting unit cost of relocation from each
airport closure was used to rank airports according to their vulnerability. Furthermore,
the authors found that having alternative airports to recover stranded passengers helped
to mitigate the impact of the closure.
Estimating the costs for the airport operator and airlines of a... 99
Finally, Voltes-Dorta et al. (2017a) built on past contributions to investigate pas-
senger recovery after an airport closure. The paper outlines a shortest-path-length
algorithm that finds the optimal alternative routing for all disrupted passengers while
also considering capacity constraints. The study combined both airline schedules and
passenger booking data. This is important because the bookings indicate the full
passenger itineraries while the schedules allow for recovery options to be established.
The impact of each investigated closure scenario is determined by the proportion of
passengers for whom an alternative itinerary within the recovery period was found
(relocation rate) and the average departure delay experienced by the passengers.
However, due to the lack of data, the authors did not attempt to translate these measures
into monetary costs. Their method is suitable for our paper since it allows us to estimate
airline costs in terms of passenger welfare as several passenger rights are triggered by
delay thresholds. The proportion of disrupted passengers who are entitled to care, the
number of overnight stays and the proportion of passengers that would require ground
transfers can be calculated.
By ranking all major European airports using the method above, Voltes-Dorta et al.
(2017a) concluded that Frankfurt stands out from the rest in terms of operational
resilience, having the highest relocation rate of 86.9% and the shortest average delays
after a hypothetical 24-h closure of the main German hub. This was linked to three
factors: 1) the dual-hub operation of Lufthansa at Frankfurt and Munich that can
provide hub alternatives for connecting markets. 2) Frankfurt’s good connectivity to
road networks offering short transfer times to nearby airports. 3) A high share of
alliance traffic, which enables Lufthansa to find alternative travel plans for its disrupted
passengers in flights of alliance partners. A faster passenger recovery translates into
lower damage costs, which makes the choice of Frankfurt a suitable one to deliver a
lower-bound estimate for the costs of a drone attack at a major hub airport.
Still, the recovery algorithms developed by past authors lack the inclusion of rail
alternatives for passengers leaving to nearby airports or cities which, if included, would
make for a more realistic approach. Additionally, the authors assumed that all passen-
gers decided to travel (i.e. no tickets got cancelled) despite the long waiting times. Also,
all flights retained their original schedules so flight delays were not modelled. Finally,
they did not consider that airlines may decide to increase aircraft capacity after the
airport reopens to speed up passenger recovery.
Contribution
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this will be the first study that investigates the
financial consequences of a drone-related airport closure for the airport operator and
airlines by performing a simulation of passenger recovery using actual data. From a
methodological perspective, we add to existing literature on airport resilience and
vulnerability because we improve on existing passenger recovery algorithms to obtain
a more precise estimate for the airline and airport costs. The improvements are the
inclusion of rail recovery options for affected passengers, as well as the implementation
of different behavioural assumptions for passengers.
Data and methodology
The main goals of the methodological process are (1) to determine the number for
passengers waiting in the terminal facilities of the airport during the simulated closure,
(2) compute optimal recovery opportunities for each passenger and (3) to calculate total
costs resulting from the simulated closure, with focus on customer welfare and loss of
revenue for the airport.
Case study
Frankfurt airport (FRA) is Germany’s largest airport and it is owned by Fraport AG. It
is Europe’s third-largest hub airport and it has its own long-distance rail station (in the
airport’s lower floors) that connects the airport with Europe’s high-speed rail network
operated by the Deutsche Bahn. The dominant airline is Lufthansa, the German flag
carrier. Due to its location in central Germany and good accessibility, it is relatively
close to other major airports such as Duesseldorf, Stuttgart, or Munich. Consequential-
ly, there are many airports that could function as an alternate airport in the event of a
complete shutdown at FRA. The annual passenger traffic at the airport increased to 69.5
million in 2018 (Fraport 2018a), representing a growth of almost 8%. Our method
focuses on departing passengers from Frankfurt (as in Voltes-Dorta et al. 2017b) in
order to calculate the “local” costs of the disruption. The top three domestic destina-
tions are Berlin, Hamburg, and Munich, while the top European destinations are
London, Vienna, and Madrid. Top destinations in Asia include Dubai, Shanghai, and
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Seoul while New York, Toronto, and Chicago are the top destinations in North
America. At Frankfurt, the share of business travellers in 2017 was 36% while leisure
accounted for 64% (Fraport 2018b).
Datasets
The method combines supply data (airline schedules and seat capacities) and
demand (passenger bookings and travel itineraries). The supply dataset is sourced
from OAG Schedules and includes all flights that take-off and land in European
airports between the 18th and the 28th of December 2017. This period was
selected because it contains the dates of the London Gatwick closures (albeit a
year earlier) and it is the period before Christmas when many people travel for
holidays and/or return to their families. The demand side is covered by a
Marketing Information Data Transfer (MIDT) dataset (sourced from OAG as
well) that provides information about passenger bookings and travel itineraries
passing through FRA during the focus week. The MIDT dataset consists of
675,095 records of 1,115,203 passengers travelling to 250 direct destinations
severed from FRA. Each record contains information about the markets served,
passenger booking class, passenger nationality (proxied by the country of sale of
the ticket), flight routing, operating airline and flight number, airline alliance,
origin and destination airport code, flight distance, number of seats, and depar-
ture and arrival times.
Other datasets were collected: 1) average airline ticket price from all three booking
classes (first, business, and economy) for short-, medium-, and long-haul flights from
FRA. This information was obtained from OAG; 2) maximum take-off weight
(MTOW) information for all aircraft types that departed in the focus week to calculate
relevant airport charges. This was also sourced from OAG; 3) airport coordinates to
determine flight distances from FRA to all served airports obtained from Google Maps;
4) reference values for welfare expenses per passenger (including hotel, vouchers, and
meals) were taken from the EasyJet website; 5) the weighted average passenger group
size (relevant to calculate hotel expenses) was taken from a 2017 passenger survey
referring to Heathrow airport conducted by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA 2017);
6) the schedule of train departures from the FRA long-distance rail station towards
major German cities was obtained from Deutsche Bahn; 7) the official 2019 Fraport
airport charges were sourced from the operator’s website (Fraport 2019); and 8) the
distance and travel time by road to alternative airports was collected from Google
Maps.
Closure scenarios
We selected four closure scenarios after a hypothetical drone sighting at FRA, all
starting at 18:00 UTC + 1 on the 19th of December 2017, with a duration of 6, 18, 24,
and 48 h for scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively, see Fig. 1. The starting time of 18:00
UTC + 1 was selected because a six-hour closure will cause passengers to stay over-
night as the airport closes anyway at 22:00 UTC + 1 due to noise restrictions. As a
result, airlines will be facing hotel and meal welfare expenses even in the shortest
scenario.
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Passenger behaviour
Because not all necessary data was available, several assumptions are needed. All
passengers will arrive to the terminal two hours before their scheduled or relocated
departure times, even during the closure period. This is to reflect the passengers’
perception that the airport can reopen at any time after the threat is neutralized. We
know there are different categories of passengers according to the place of residence
(“local” Frankfurt travellers, non-local “rest of Germany”, and foreign) and flight
destination (domestic or international). It was assumed that 50% of all German
passengers travelling internationally from FRA are local residents from Frankfurt am
Main or neighbouring towns. The behavioural assumptions are summarized in Fig. 2.
All German passengers (local and non-local) can be offered either rail or air transport
itineraries (train being the preferential recovery mode for domestic travel), while
foreign passengers will only have air transport available. German passengers travelling
internationally may be offered a rail transfer to another German airport to continue their
travel from there. Local passengers travelling internationally are assumed to leave the
airport terminal after a 3-h delay and return to the terminal two hours before their new
departure time. All other passenger categories, including non-locals and foreign trav-
ellers, remain in (or around) the terminal until their new departure time. Finally, we
assume that there are only leisure travellers during the sample Christmas period. This
includes all business travellers who are likely to be returning home. This implies that all
passengers are expected to accept their alternative flight itineraries, regardless of delay,
due to their higher flexibility in terms of departure times in comparison with business
travellers (Alderighi et al. 2016).
Recovery assumptions
We assume that the airport cancels all flights until three hours before reopening, at
which time flights can be delayed. Figure 3 provides an outline of the slot allocation
logic for the delayed departures. Flights scheduled to depart in the hour before
reopening will be moved to the first hourly slot. International and domestic flights
Fig. 1 Overview of the four closure scenarios. Source: Own elaboration
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departing between one and three hours before reopening will be allocated to the second
and third hourly slots after reopening, respectively. Passengers can only be offered
alternative itineraries if seat capacity is available. After reopening, full-service airlines
are assumed to increase seat capacity in a fixed percentage (e.g. 10%) by deploying
larger aircraft models to speed up the recovery process.1
Finally, we define three options available for airlines to re-allocate their passengers.
The “Airline” option means that only their own flights can be used. “Alliance” means
that affected carriers can tap into the seat capacity of their alliance partners (Oneword,
Skyteam, or Star Alliance). Lastly, “All” means that passengers will be offered the next
available flight to their destination from any airline with free capacity. The Alliance
option is be the default one.
Some passengers can also be offered a direct high-speed rail connection to 19 cities
reachable without changes from the airport’s long-distance rail station. Cities in
Germany include Munich, Berlin, Hamburg while European cities selected include
Amsterdam, Basel, and Brussels. Passengers can also take onward flights from any
other German airport reachable by train from Frankfurt. No seat capacity restrictions
are set for high-speed rail travel segments due to the large number of departures
available from the airport station.
Relocation algorithm
Fig. 2 Assumed passenger behaviour during the closure. Source: Own elaboration
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The algorithm was written in Virtual Basic for Application (VBA) language and
executed as an Excel macro. It is based on three data frames: PAX includes the original
passenger records, the ALTERNATIVE FLIGHTS data frame includes all available
recovery itineraries, and SEAT CAPACITY indicates the available seat capacity in
each itinerary. After setting the parameters of the closure, the records in PAX are
1 Low-cost carriers (LCC) operate a limited variety of aircraft types. Hence, LCC flights will not increase
capacity. Airlines serving long-haul international connections may be constrained in their capacity response as
well. This will be covered by the sensitivity analysis.
Determination of costs
Lost revenue for Frankfurt airport is based on “affected arrivals” and their associated
passenger-related charges. Departing passenger charges for non-recovered trips are lost
as well. Landing charges are €1.90 per ton of aircraft Maximum Take-off Weight
(MTOW); passenger charges are €18.16 per departing passenger for domestic and EU
flights, €22.84 for non-EU flights, €25.16€ for intercontinental flights, and €12.93 for
transfer passenger to all destinations. Security charges are 1,24€ per departing passen-
ger (Fraport 2019).
Fig. 3 Slot allocation for delayed departures. Source: Own Elaboration
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labelled as “affected departure”, “affected arrival”, or “unaffected”, depending on
whether the flight was scheduled to depart or arrive during the simulated closure.
The “affected departure” records are then sorted by departing time so that seat capacity
is allocated first-come-first-served. The SEAT CAPACITY data frame is built by
aggregating the original PAX records to determine the free seats available per flight
over the sample week. The ALTERNATIVE FLIGHTS data frame contains all unaf-
fected feasible flight itineraries (depending on the recovery option, e.g. “Alliance”) as
well as the rail itineraries out of FRA and the selected alternate airports in Germany.
Table 2 summarizes the steps of the passenger recovery algorithm. First, all German
passengers travelling internationally will be randomly assigned, depending on the
probability of them being local (e.g. 50%), to leave the airport during the closure and
return to their homes. The search for a new itinerary is structured as a loop that runs
through each affected PAX record. For all German passengers travelling domestically,
a direct train connection will be searched first in ALTERNATIVE FLIGHTS, see step
3a. Should no train be found, and for all other passenger categories, the macro will
directly search for the next possible flight connection to the destination airport indicated
in the relevant PAX record (3b). Another match function, step 3c, will now check this
exact flight in the SEAT CAPACITY data frame. Should there be a free seat available,
the capacity will be reduced by one and the found alternative flight will be added to the
PAX record (indicating flight number, operator, and new departure time) closing the
loop. If, however, there was no free seat available, the algorithm will repeat steps 3b
and 3c, explicitly discarding the last solution, as many times as necessary until a seat is
found or no alternative flight could be found within one week after the airport
reopening, in which case the PAX record will be updated indicating that neither flight
nor train options could be found. Steps 2a to 2c and 3a to 3c in Table 2 will repeat in the
same manner for all four closure scenarios.
Table 2 Passenger recovery algorithm
Steps Location Actions
1a Passenger recovery \ Cale PAX recovery Clean range containing previous alternative flight
searches.
1b Passenger recovery \ Cale PAX recovery Set all German passengers traveling domestically to
“leave”.
1c Passenger recovery \ Cale PAX recovery Randomly assign “leave” to German passengers
traveling internationally in 70%, 50%, or 30% of the
cases based on the selection made, all remaining will
be assigned “stay”.
Start loop 1
2a Passenger recovery \ All Set current scenario (1–4) in the dashboard, refresh all
worksheets, and filter ranges in descending order in
alternative flights
Start loop 2
3a Passenger recovery \ Cale PAX recovery
and Passenger recovery \ alternative
flights
For passenger X, search (match function) for the next
possible available flight (based on origin, destination,
operating airline, and departure date) available
without considering seat capacity restriction nor the
passengers’ origin but only on the first run cycle.
Destination airport must however remain the same.
3b Passenger recovery \ Cale PAX recovery
and Passenger recovery \ alternative
flights
For the same passenger X, search (match function) for
the next possible available flight with the restriction
of the same airline or alliance or none of the listed
restrictions based on the selected recovery option at
the beginning. Searching for origin, destination,
operating airline/alliance/none, and departure date.
Destination airport must however remain the same.
3c Passenger recovery \ alternative flights and
Passenger recovery \ seat capacity
Check (match function) the seat capacity from the
previously found flight. If seats are available,
continue next and write the record found in the
corresponding passenger record in the “calculated
PAX recovery” worksheet. If not, go back to the
beginning (3b) and search for another flight five
minutes later.
End loop 2
2b Passenger recovery \ alternative flights and
Passenger recovery \ Cale PAX recovery
If the passenger is German and no seat is found, search
(match function) for the possible available train
keeping the destination airport the same. If a train is
found, write the record in the corresponding
passenger record in the “calculated PAX recovery”
worksheet. If no train was found, write “no available
flight nor train found” in the corresponding passenger
record in the “calculated PAX recovery” worksheet.
2c Passenger recovery \ alternative flights and
Passenger recovery \ Cale PAX recovery
If the passenger is not German, write “no flight
alternative found overall” in the corresponding
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The recovery algorithm, in combination with the behavioural assumptions, deter-
mines the time each affected passenger will stay within the airport terminals before their
alternative flight. For non-local passengers with no alternative flight, a maximum stay
of five days was assumed. Airline costs predominately arise from customer welfare
expenses which consist of vouchers, meals, and accommodation. Using EasyJet com-
pensation guidelines as an approximation, vouchers worth €4.5 are distributed to
passengers on flights up to 1500 km every two hours and for flights over 1500 km
every three hours. Meals at hotels include an evening dinner and breakfast for €25 per
person per day (EasyJet 2017). Hotel night stays are estimated at €90 per room per
night based on average online pricing (Anon 2019b). Passengers travel in a weighted
average group size of 1.657 people, based on the CAA passenger survey from London
Heathrow (CAA 2017). Thus, hotel costs per person are reduced to €54.3 per person
per night. It was also assumed that nearby hotels have enough room capacity. If welfare
expenses exceed the average ticket price for a given passenger, then the airline decides
to refund the ticket instead. According to OAG data, the average return ticket for long-
haul flights during that period was €1013.80, for medium-haul it was €318.66 and for
short-haul flights it was €269.21. Thus, passenger welfare costs are effectively capped
by these amounts.
Besides the airline and airport costs, we also calculate the average delay experienced




In real-world circumstances, many passengers would be offered military beds (that
airports have for emergencies), which can reduce costs for the airline compared to those
assumed in this simulation. Perhaps the most significant limitation is that passenger
behaviour is nearly impossible to predict as it can depend on their stress tolerance, age,
group size, or travel purpose. Furthermore, the proposed method does not consider
aircraft or crew positioning or working hour restrictions. Finally, we do not account for
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We carry out a sensitivity analysis to explore the impact on the estimated airport and
airline costs of variations in four key simulation parameters: a) the “waiting hours”
denotes the time local passengers stay in the terminal before leaving to wait for their
new itinerary elsewhere, b) the % of local German passengers, c) the “capacity
response” parameter indicates the percentage increase in seat capacity deployed by
airlines to speed up recovery after the airport reopens, and d) “recovery” indicates the
options available for airlines to recover the passengers (“Airline”, “Alliance”, or “All”).
A total of seven cases (labelled from A to G) were created by modifying the parameters
(Table 3). Case D is the central case for the purposes of this research, and it assumes 3-
h waiting time, 50% local Germans, 10% extra capacity, and Alliance recovery as
described in the sections above. Reference to the other cases will be made concerning
the total cost of passenger welfare expenses ranging from the worst-case A to the best-
case G. The combination of 7 cases and 4 closure scenarios means that 28 simulations
will be run.
group recovery due to data limitations but only find alternative itineraries for individual
travellers.
Results and discussion
An overview of the estimated loss of revenue for the airport operator across the
“central” cases (D) of each of the four closure scenarios is shown in Table 4. This
includes the loss of departure and landing charges, passenger handling charges, and
passenger security charges. The results for the other cases are shown in Appendix
Fig. 5, but the variability across cases does not affect the main conclusions of the study.
The loss associated to Scenario 1 (six hours) was approximately €0.35 million. For
Scenarios 2 and 3 the resulting lost revenue for FRAwas approximately €1.13 million
and €1.67 million, respectively. For the most extended simulated closure, the lost
revenue increased to €3.3 million when compared to Scenario 1. Referring to Table 5,
by far the most significant loss for the airport are passenger handling charges making
up on average 76% of the total lost revenue. Departure and landing charges made up an
average of 18% and passenger security charges accounted for an average of 6% of the
total revenue loss.
Considering that our methodology leads to lower-bound cost estimates, the cost for
installing a counter-drone system would already be justified. Still, a single system
Table 3 Different cases for sensitivity analysis
Worst-Best Cases Waiting hours % of local Germans Capacity response Recovery
Worst A 4 30% 0% Airline
B 3 30% 0% Airline
C 3 30% 10% Airline
Central D 3 50% 10% Alliance
E 2 50% 10% Alliance
F 2 50% 20% Alliance
Best G 2 70% 20% All
Source: Own Elaboration
Table 4 Overview of the lost revenue for the airport across all four closure scenarios (central cases)
Loss revenue factors (€) Scenarios
1 (6 h) 2 (18 h) 3 (24 h) 4 (48 h)
Departure / landing charges 74,066 197,154 288,547 574,834
PAX charges 252,885 870,292 1,283,677 2,524,811
PAX security charges 20,801 59,297 98,017 197,562
Total loss of revenue 347,752 1,126,743 1,670,241 3,297,206
Loss of revenue per hour 57,959 62,597 69,593 68,692
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worth €2.9 million would not cover the entire perimeter of the airport. A two-system
investment of €5.8 million would not be justified by a single 48 h event, but,
considering the frequency of past drone sightings at FRA, it may end up delivering
good value over time. With an approximate loss of revenue of €1.5 million per day, the
suggested two systems for Frankfurt would be justified after 89.6 h or 3.8 days of
closure.
Total passenger welfare costs across the “central” cases (D) of each of the four
closure scenarios are shown in Table 6. The cost for Scenario 1 is approximately €2.3
million, while the longest closure generated expenses of almost €34.30 million. This
value comes close to the estimates from the Gatwick incident of approximately €38–44
million (Calder 2019). Clearly, the most important cost factor are hotel stays, which
account for more than half of the costs in all scenarios. Also, airline costs are not linear
and costs per hour increase between the first and second day of closure. In the 24 h
closure, the average cost per hour is €0.46 million, and in the 48 h closure, the average
cost increases to €0.71 million per hour. This is due to the accumulation of passengers
as we assume that they keep arriving to the terminal, even during the closure period,
due to the uncertainty about reopening and the rate of recovery (by road or rail) being
very low in the first hours (Fig. 4). Overall, it takes between six to seven days for the
airlines to provide an alternative travel plan to all stranded passengers. Almost 111,000
passengers accumulate in the terminals on the second evening of the simulated closure
in Scenario 4, just before the airport reopens for regular operation. Thus, airlines clearly
want to provide passengers with alternative flights or a refund as quickly as possible to
reduce their welfare expenses.
Unsurprisingly, Lufthansa is the most affected airline. Looking at Scenario 4,
Lufthansa alone transported 81,257 passengers compared to 6559 with Ryanair and
Table 5 Breakdown of airport losses across all four closure scenarios (central cases)
Loss revenue factors shares Scenarios Average
1 (6 h) 2 (18 h) 3 (24 h) 4 (48 h)
Departure / landing charges 21% 17% 17% 17% 18%
PAX charges 73% 77% 77% 77% 76%
PAX security charges 6% 5% 6% 6% 6%
Table 6 Overview of the airline costs across all four closure scenarios (central cases)
Loss revenue factors (€) Scenarios
1 (6 h) 2 (18 h) 3 (24 h) 4 (48 h)
Passenger welfare costs 2,288,378 6,264,033 11,084,449 34,279,860
Costs per hour 381,396 348,001 461,852 714,163
Hotel 55.30% 55.10% 53.40% 52.90%
Meals 25.50% 25.40% 24.60% 24.30%
Voucher 19.20% 19.60% 22.00% 22.80%
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4660 with Condor. Therefore, Lufthansa accounts, on average, for approximately
54.1% of all welfare expenses in each simulated scenario as seen in Table 7. This
suggests that Lufthansa could have a high interest in contributing to the acquisition of a
counter-drone system to reduce the cost experienced in case of future events.
When investigating the role of intermodality in the recovery process, we found that
only 4.5% of passengers took a rail option. One may argue this is rather low, given the
unlimited capacity we assumed, but this could be explained because German passen-
gers represent around 30% of all passengers and, of those, 85% travel internationally
during the sample dates.
Fig. 4 Hourly evolution of disrupted passengers in the terminals during the recovery window (central cases)
Table 7 Overview of the Lufthansa costs across all four closure scenarios (central cases)
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Table 8 shows the average delays per passenger and non-relocation rates across
all four closure scenarios. 9.5% of all passengers were not recovered in Scenario 1
increasing to 13.9%, 14.7%, and finally to 28.3% for Scenarios 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. The results for all other cases are shown in Appendix Fig. 6. When
evaluating all cases, it seems that the increase in seat capacity had the most
significant effect on the reduction of cost as seen from the difference in cases B
to C and E to F. It should be noted, however, that this recovery option only
applies to full-service carriers because those are assumed to have larger aircraft in
their fleet that could be used during the recovery process. As Lufthansa is the
primary operating airline at Frankfurt, both alliance support and increasing seat
capacity will have an important impact in reducing the costs. The average depar-
ture delay experienced by the passengers at FRA in the worst-case closure
scenario of 48 h was 74.8 h while for 24 h it reduced to 45.3 h, which explains
the large welfare costs for the airlines (Table 8).
Looking at the origin airport of the affected arriving passengers and the
destination airports of affected departing passengers, we find that the top-five
affected airports for the longest closure of 48 h are Heathrow, Madrid, Vienna,
Bangkok, and Dubai in descending order. Those airports might experience minor
passenger accumulations in the terminals as departing flights to Frankfurt will get
cancelled. Airports in the Far East such as Korea and Bangkok experience no-
relocation rates of 68.7% and 70.4%, respectively, mainly due to the low frequen-
cy of aircraft movements in the sample period. This results clearly illustrates the
global impact of the event, which hints at the potential interest of airline alliances,
such as Star Alliance, to also contribute to the investment to prevent disruptions
across the alliance’s main global hubs.
Thus, the main conclusion is that, in view of the revenue loss for FRA, the
acquisition of a counter-drone system can be justified when considering the possibility
of several drone occurrences over time as current statistics show. Bringing airline costs
into consideration, the decision becomes even more justifiable as Lufthansa could have
a big interest in contributing to protect against high welfare costs and avoid customer
dissatisfaction. Furthermore, it should be noted that real costs of a drone-related closure
should be higher if we added arriving passengers and costs at other locations. From the
current data analysed, the authors found that getting the support of airline alliances and
increasing seat capacity after reopening are more effective than high-speed rail options
in order to reduce passenger delays.
Summary
This research aims to identify whether the investment cost of a counter-drone
system at Frankfurt airport can be justified in comparison to the total cost
experienced by the airport and airlines as a result of a complete shutdown due
to a drone sighting in a period of peak activity similar to the 2018 Gatwick
incident. Our method identifies the affected passengers for different closure
scenarios and a custom-designed algorithm then searches for the next possible
alternative connection with available seat capacity. Welfare costs for airlines
consist of meal vouchers and hotel stays for the waiting time passengers spend
on the terminal. Costs for the airport operator relate to loss of landing and
passenger charges due to the cancellation of flights.
The findings revealed that the worst-case scenario of a continuous 48-h closure
caused approximately €3.3 million in lost revenue for Frankfurt airport and €34.30
million in passenger welfare costs for the airlines. This only includes departing
passengers at Frankfurt and thus, it can be considered a lower-bound estimate. Still,
Table 8 Average delays per passenger and non-relocation rates across all four closure scenarios (central cases)
Simulated Scenario 1 2 3 4
Average delay experienced per passengers (h) 36.3 37.9 45.3 74.8
Non-relocated passengers (%) 9.5% 13.9% 14.7% 28.3%
110 Wendt P. et al.
our results are sufficient to answer our main research question: the investment cost of a
counter-drone system worth approximately €2.9 million per unit can be justified from
the perspective of the airport operator (Fraport) based on the costs of a single 48-h
incident during a peak period of activity. For two systems, the costs would be offset by
the accumulation of shorter closure events for about 90 h. For further investments,
dominant airlines may want to consider contributing funds since they are the ones
bearing the highest costs. In the case of Frankfurt, Lufthansa alone experienced nearly
51.4% of the welfare expenses.
In relation to other airports, it is worth noting that Frankfurt is very well developed
as an intermodal platform, which may explain why it has lower costs than Gatwick as it
is easier for disrupted passengers to access alternative modes of transport. As Voltes-
Dorta et al. (2017a) found, Frankfurt also is one of the most resilient airports in Europe
and hence, the costs per passenger for other major European airports are likely to be
even higher. Moreover, a larger presence of low-cost carriers in other hubs can make
recovery worse due to the lack of alliance partners. As the number of consumer drone
purchases is expected to increase in the future, it might only be a matter of time until the
next major incident happens. On the other hand, with the strong increase in the number
of counter-drone manufacturers on the market, there is also great potential for technol-
ogy to develop and become more affordable. In addition, airports should not forget to
implement other measures to complement anti-drone technology and possibly shorten
the closures. For example, introducing a system to generate reports of drone activity
from trusted sources, or engaging the airport’s closed-circuit video systems to identify
the type of drone causing the disruption (Willis Tower Watson, 2019).
Still, the conclusions of our paper should be taken with caution due to several
shortcomings. First, we ignore the cost for airlines relocating their cabin crew and
pilots, providing accommodation and transport to other airports for cabin crew and
pilots, repositioning aircraft that were diverted to other airports, or other long-term
effects such as increased insurance premiums for airport and airlines due to more
frequent drone attack occurrences. Third, future research could consider the knock-on
effect to other airports caused by aircraft not departing from Frankfurt or passengers
stranded at other airports waiting to depart to Frankfurt as local disruptions can have
global impacts. At the same time, one may investigate the costs for service providers
such as ground handling crews or the increased revenue for the airport in retail
concessions due to longer passenger dwell times. Applying the methods developed in
this research, one may rank airports worldwide according to their vulnerability to drone
attacks in order to establish a typology of airports in which investment would be
justified.
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Appendix A
1 2 3 4
A 3 8 14 38
B 3 8 14 38
C 2 7 12 35
D 2 6 11 34
E 2 6 11 34
F 2 6 10 31



























Fig. 5 Total passenger welfare costs for all simulated closure scenarios and cases
112 Wendt P. et al.
Appendix B
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and
indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the
article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
1 2 3 4
A 17.4% 20.7% 22.2% 44.0%
B 17.4% 20.2% 21.9% 44.0%
C 11.3% 15.1% 15.9% 31.1%
D 9.5% 13.9% 14.7% 28.3%
E 9.5% 13.9% 14.7% 28.3%
F 6.6% 11.3% 12.1% 20.0%



































Fig. 6 Proportion of non-relocated passengers for all simulated closure scenarios and cases
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